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Abstract
Background: Human African trypanosomiasis (HAT), or sleeping sickness, is a fatal neglected tropical disease if left
untreated. HAT primarily affects people living in rural sub-Saharan Africa, often in regions afflicted by violent
conflict. Screening and treatment of HAT is complex and resource-intensive, and especially difficult in insecure,
resource-constrained settings. The country with the highest endemicity of HAT is the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), which has a number of foci of high disease prevalence. We present here the challenges of carrying
out HAT control programmes in general and in a conflict-affected region of DRC. We discuss the difficulties of
measuring disease burden, medical care complexities, waning international support, and research and development
barriers for HAT.
Discussion: In 2007, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) began screening for HAT in the Haut-Uélé and Bas-Uélé
districts of Orientale Province in northeastern DRC, an area of high prevalence affected by armed conflict. Through
early 2009, HAT prevalence rate of 3.4% was found, reaching 10% in some villages. More than 46,000 patients were
screened and 1,570 treated for HAT during this time. In March 2009, two treatment centres were forced to close
due to insecurity, disrupting patient treatment, follow-up, and transmission-control efforts. One project was
reopened in December 2009 when the security situation improved, and another in late 2010 based on concerns
that population displacement might reactivate historic foci. In all of 2010, 770 patients were treated at these sites,
despite a limited geographical range of action for the mobile teams.
Summary: In conflict settings where HAT is prevalent, targeted medical interventions are needed to provide care
to the patients caught in these areas. Strategies of integrating care into existing health systems may be unfeasible
since such infrastructure is often absent in resource-poor contexts. HAT care in conflict areas must balance
logistical and medical capacity with security considerations, and community networks and international-response
coordination should be maintained. Research and development for less complicated, field-adapted tools for
diagnosis and treatment, and international support for funding and program implementation, are urgently needed
to facilitate HAT control in these remote and insecure areas.
Background
Significant progress has been made towards the elimina-
tion of human African trypanosomiasis (HAT; sleeping
sickness), which has historically ravaged communities
with serious socioeconomic impacts. HAT is now con-
fined to specific geographic foci [1,2] characterized by
remoteness and neglect, and commonly in areas of poli-
tical instability and/or armed conflict, with the bulk of
the known disease burden in the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) [3].
Sustained instability and violence have massive impacts
on the health of affected populations. In DRC and else-
where more people die of treatable diseases during con-
flict than they do of conflict-related injuries or casualties
[4-7]. This is partly because the already poor state of
health care services in these areas is further degraded to
where preventable diseases requiring only basic interven-
tions, such as malaria, measles, or diarrhoea, can run
rampant. HAT caused by Trypanosoma brucei gambiense
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during conflict in endemic areas. Given the time frame
for disruption of HAT control activities, evolution of the
transmission cycle, and disease progression, incidence
can peak several years on.
HAT develops in two stages: early, haemolymphatic
(stage 1) and late, neurologic (stage 2) disease. If left
untreated, stage 2 HAT progresses almost invariably to
death, with very few cases escaping this by resolving or
becoming a chronic carrier [8]. Screening, treatment,
and management are notoriously difficult. The reasons
are numerous and include the fact that HAT diagnostic
tools are dated and often difficult to use in resource-
limited settings. For instance, a lumbar puncture is
required to establish if a person is in the late neurologic
stage of the disease. Other factors include difficulties in
accessing known or suspected endemic areas that are
remote and/or insecure, lack of robust surveillance of
old foci, and complex treatments that are labour- and
resource-intensive.
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has been diagnosing
and treating HAT for over 25 years. Currently MSF pro-
vides HAT screening and treatment in DRC and Central
African Republic (CAR) and supports Ministry of Health
(MOH) activities in Uganda and South Sudan. We dis-
cuss here the operational and medical challenges of
managing HAT in general and in conflict areas, focusing
on one region in DRC.
Difficulties Estimating Disease Burden of Sleeping
Sickness
HAT has ravaged Africa over the last century with
severe epidemics in West Africa, Kenya, Tanzania,
Uganda, Nigeria, and the Congo basin [9]. By the 1960s,
t h ed i s e a s ew a sb r o u g h tu n d er control through vector
control and mobile teams conducting active surveillance
of the population, implemented by colonial powers.
However, neglect and complacency led to the re-emer-
gence of HAT in the mid-1970s, and outbreaks contin-
ued until the end of the 20
th century.
Recent data show that HAT has been brought under
control again in certain areas owing to the cessation of
large-scale conflicts, such as in Angola; substantial colla-
borative efforts amongst the World Health Organisation
(WHO), national control programmes, and nongovern-
mental organisations (NGOs) using ambitious vertical
programmes for active case finding and treatment; and
agreements from key pharmaceutical companies (sanofi-
aventis and Bayer) to provide free antitrypanosomal
drugs. In May 2007, a report from a WHO consultation
meeting on sustainable HAT control concluded that
elimination was possible [10]. Nevertheless, elimination
of HAT as a public health problem will require continu-
ous efforts and innovative approaches [11].
WHO has undertaken an ambitious global mapping
exercise for HAT [12] (Figure 1), and current data show
a significant decrease in reported cases over the past
decade. In 1998, a high peak of 37,385 T.b. gambiense
HAT cases was reported [13]. In 2004, a total of 17,130
cases were reported, and 9,688 in 2009 [12]. The coun-
tries with the highest incidence of new cases in 2009 are
DRC with 7,183, CAR with 1,054, Chad with 510, and
Sudan with 376. Over time the DRC has consistently
held by far the bulk of the disease burden [12].
The number of detected cases of HAT has no doubt
decreased in the last decade. However, large endemic
areas escape surveillance, and most HAT patients are
likely to remain undetected until these neglected foci
receive attention [1]. Figures of reported cases therefore
need to be treated with caution.
Many at-risk areas often stru g g l et op r o v i d ea n ys o r t
of basic health care and lack overall capacity to under-
take complex diagnostics and treatment, as well as to
respond with active case finding. Therefore, certain
HAT hot spots remain and have in common the general
problems of poverty, remoteness, instability, and inse-
curity (Figure 1).
Medical Complexities of Hat Care
Providing medical care for HAT, including active
screening, diagnosis, treatment, and follow-up, is a
daunting challenge in remote, resource-poor, and inse-
cure settings [14]. Active screening, in which mobile
teams regularly travel to remote villages to test the
population, is highly important for extensive and early
case detection, leading to disease control. Passive
screening entails testing at fixed health sites and is
mostly insufficient for HAT control as only a fraction of
the T.b. gambiense-infected population has access to
health facilities. Also, as stage 1 HAT can mimic less
serious diseases, infected people often do not present
for diagnosis until stage 2, prolonging their time in the
community as part of the transmission cycle. Despite
greatly increasing detection, active screening is more
logistically complex and costly than passive surveillance.
The current tools for HAT diagnostics are dated and
require specific skills, training, and equipment. To diag-
nose the neurological late stage of the disease, a lumbar
puncture is required to identify trypanosomes and count
white blood cells in the cerebrospinal fluid (CSF). Lum-
bar puncture is painful and uncomfortable for the patient
and difficult to carry out by the practitioner, especially in
resource-limited settings, and commonly cause fear and
suspicion that lead to reluctance to testing. In addition,
the visualisation of trypanosomes and counting of white
cells in the CSF require significant laboratory skills.
Existing treatment options are complex and require a
significant level of health-care capacities. Treatment of
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Page 2 of 8stage 1 HAT (7 days of daily intramuscular pentamidine
for T.b. gambiense HAT) is relatively uncomplicated but
still requires skilled nursing staff. For treatment of stage
2 T.b. gambiense HAT, the recent addition of nifurti-
mox-eflornithine combination therapy (NECT) to the
therapeutic arsenal has been a major improvement, by
reducing the length (from 2 to 1 week) and complexity
( f r o m5 6t o1 4i n f u s i o n s )o ft h ep r e v i o u s l yp r e f e r r e d
treatment of eflornithine monotherapy [15-17]. How-
ever, NECT administration remains labour-intensive,
requiring 7 days of infusions of eflornithine twice a day,
plus 10 days of oral nifurtimox tablets 3 times a day. A
minimum of 4 nurses (to cover a 24-hour shift), to give
the intravenous infusions, and a doctor, to prescribe
treatment and manage potential adverse events, are
required.
According to WHO recommendations, 24 months of
follow-up with control visits every 6 months are
required to establish HAT cure in a patient [18]. Such
long follow-up is difficult to perform in resource-limited
settings. As with surveillance, patients often cannot
reach health facilities, and tracking patients after they
have been treated and left the health centre is proble-
matic. Other factors such as population displacements
and fear of lumbar punctures also negatively affect
patient follow-up care.
Challenges of Hat Control in Conflict Zones
The constraints of complicated diagnosis and complex
treatment and follow-up are compounded by the
remote, rural locations in which HAT is prevalent, areas
that are difficult to access and often experience violent
conflict or political instability (Table 1). This poses a
serious challenge because to effectively treat cases and
lower prevalence in an affected area, the ability to travel
and actively find cases with mobile teams is crucial.
Although passive case finding is important and has an
impact on overall mortality [19], more cases of late-
stage than early haemolymphatic stage disease are typi-




Figure 1 High-prevalence HAT areas in central Africa, 2000-2009. Source: Reproduced under open-access attribution from Simarro PP et al.
Int J Health Geogr 2010, 9:57. [12]
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If medical teams cannot reach patients or people are
unable to travel to health sites due to insecurity or con-
flict, patient care and disease control are severely
impaired.
Post-treatment follow-up of patients is deeply dis-
rupted in conflict zones. The negative impact of low
attendance rate to follow-up visits on HAT control
would depend on the efficacy of treatment administered.
The rate of definite cure is high in stage 1 patients trea-
ted with pentamidine and appears to be high in stage 2
patients treated with NECT [15]. If the latter is con-
firmed in ongoing studies and pharmacovigilance activ-
ities on larger numbers of patients, the relevance of
systematic patient follow-up would become question-
able. Allocating scarce existing resources to other con-
trol activities may be more cost-effective.
Mobilising the community to raise awareness and gain
support for screening and treatment is also critical. Dur-
ing periods of political instability and conflict, the com-
munity can be stressed, people may be displaced, and
the leadership and organisation of community life is
often disrupted. Therefore, although highly difficult dur-
ing times of conflict, establishing and maintaining the
networks necessary for community support of an effec-
tive medical programme is important.
HAT and Conflict in the DRC
All of the constraints and challenges of HAT treatment
in resource-poor conflict zones can be found in the
Haut-Uélé and Bas-Uélé areas of the Orientale Province
of northeastern DRC. No HAT activities had been
undertaken for over three decades before 2007, mainly
because of the remoteness of the areas [1]. These areas
border others with a history of HAT in CAR and South
Sudan.
In mid-2007, MSF launched projects to detect and
treat HAT in the zones de santé (administrative dis-
tricts) of Doruma, Ango, and Bili in Orientale Province
(Figure 2). From June 2007 to March 2009, MSF found
areas of high infection, and 3.4% (1,570) of the 46,601
people screened were positive and treated for HAT [1],
with some pockets as high as 10%. A large proportion of
cases were diagnosed in the early stage (60%), indicating
intense transmission. These rates are worrisome and
amongst the highest reported in DRC.
In early 2008, the MSF treatment centre in Bokoyo
was closed for over one month because of conflict-
related insecurity. From September 2008, this insecurity
and violence, which had been exacerbated by joint mili-
tary operations undertaken by the Congolese army
together with Ugandan troops against the Lord’sR e s i s -
tance Army (LRA), threatened all MSF activities in the
region.
In March 2009, the town of Banda was attacked, kid-
nappings occurred, and the MSF compound was looted.
All the medical stock was taken and the referral HAT
treatment centre looted. Following this, all MSF HAT
projects in the area (Doruma, Ango, Bili) were sus-
pended. The lack of trained staff in existing health
structures and the complexity of HAT diagnosis and
treatment prevented any emergency handover of the
project to local partners. Prolonged interruption of the
projects thus resulted in people not being diagnosed and
treated, lack of follow-up of patients already treated, and
disruption of initial control efforts, with likely subse-
quent deaths and increased disease transmission. Prior
to suspension of activities, the geographical limits of the
endemic focus had not been reached. Moreover, with
the conflict came displacement, so concerns arose of
HAT spreading into new areas or reactivating old foci
with population movements.
In December 2009, MSF undertook an assessment of
the Doruma health site, and the project was reopened
there the following month, performing active screening
and treatment. In all of 2010, 485 patients were treated
in Doruma. Because of the ongoing conflict and insecur-
ity, only a relatively small area (~10-km enclave) of Dor-
uma could be covered by the mobile team. This
exclusion of previous sites restricted the overall impact
of HAT control efforts in the region. Active screening
extended to further areas remains dependent on the
ever-changing security situation.
Also in December 2009, exploratory missions of two
areas in Bas-Uélé district, Dingila and Poko, were car-
ried out. These explorations were performed because of
the displacement of populations from the Ango health
Table 1 Specific challenges of HAT control in conflict
zones
￿ Conflict-afflicted areas are often already remote with minimal (if any)
health infrastructures and limited numbers of trained medical staff, and
their often precarious state is further eroded by insecurity.
￿ Insecurity often hinders active case-finding activities since mobile
teams are often restricted in their travel.
￿ Populations often move, hampering treatment provision and post-
treatment monitoring and follow-up.
￿ Population movements can also trigger new foci or reactivate old
ones.
￿ Community awareness and support are important factors for effective
screening and treatment. Population displacement due to insecurity can
rupture community networks.
￿ Direct attacks of treatment centres or transport trucks can lead to
programme interruption or cessation, withdrawal of supporting
international NGOs and key national staff, or disruption of logistic
support.
￿ Difficult diagnosis, complex treatment, and long follow-up are
especially challenging in conflict situations, because of the high
technical skills and continuity of service required.
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flies in the region, and accessibility of the areas due to
previous MSF intervention (measles vaccination cam-
paign). A relatively high number of HAT cases were
found in Dingila: 28 (4.4%) of 630 tested individuals,
with most cases in early-stage disease indicating
intense transmission. This finding was alarming in part
because this location, south of the Uele River, had had
no recent cases of HAT, but according to the local
population, people in the area were treated for HAT
during the 1960s. Thus, the possibility existed of rapid
re-infestation of this area based on previous endemi-
city. A new HAT project was opened in Dingila in
September 2010. Through December 2010, 365 (3%) of
12,281 people screened were diagnosed with HAT and
285 treated.
Impacts in Bordering Areas
Political instability and conflict often cause people to
flee in order to seek refuge. One consequence is that
those infected by HAT are unable to access treatment
or fail to obtain follow-up care. Another potential con-
sequence is that those infected with HAT can possibly
spread the disease by entering a new cycle of transmis-
sion as the parasite may thrive in previously uninfected
vectors. Displaced populations in the Orientale Province
of DRC are entering new regions, raising the risk of
reactivating historically cleared pockets or creating new
Figure 2 MSF HAT programme sites in Orientale Province, DRC, December 2010.
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Dingila. Due to insecurity and the challenges of
responding to conflict, controlling and understanding
HAT spread because of displacement is extremely
difficult.
Moreover, the concerted response by the national
armies to the conflict is pushing the LRA to move their
activities into areas of CAR, where HAT is endemic,
triggering further displacement of local populations.
Haut-Uélé also borders Uganda and South Sudan, with
the latter highly under-resourced and subject to spora-
dic conflict and political tension. Exact figures cannot
yet be confirmed, but anecdotally based on MSF experi-
ence, some HAT cases in Congolese refugees from
Haut-Uélé have been found in Yambio in South Sudan.
Numbers of displaced persons change often; population
movements can be mercurial, and people often go unregis-
tered. For 2009, the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 20,899 refugees from
DRC entered CAR and 19,709 entered Sudan [20]. These
figures do not give a breakdown of where in DRC people
have been displaced from, but a significant number are
expected to have originated from the conflict in the Ueles.
Effective response across borders and amongst refugees
needs coordination between the respective national health
authorities, and with UNHCR, which poses a challenge if
capacities to carry out basic health care activities on a
national level are lacking.
Research and Development Hurdles
Research and development (R&D) for new, simpler diag-
nostic tools and treatments for HAT are urgently needed
to eliminate the disease or at least facilitate its control.
This requires setting up and performing clinical trials in
HAT-endemic settings, which could include post-conflict
areas. The presence of the disease in remote and unstable
s e t t i n g sb r i n g st h ec h a l l e n g eo f feasibility of conducting
clinical trials based on Good Clinical Practice (GCP)
guidelines in such resource-limited contexts. The follow-
up required to declare disease cure (up to 24 months),
with control visits every 6 months after the end of treat-
ment [18], can only be carried out if a long-term, stable
environment is available at clinical research sites. A
recent study on possible early surrogate markers of cure
showed a diagnostic algorithm that could reduce the fol-
low-up to 6 months in most patients and to 12 months
in those showing doubtful results at 6-month visit, but it
has not yet been formally validated [21].
The steady decline in reported HAT cases, which is a
promising outcome in itself, is an additional challenge
to conduct adequately powered clinical trials. On the
o n eh a n d ,t h en u m b e ro fp a t i e n t sa v a i l a b l et ob e
enrolled in clinical trials is decreasing. On the other
hand, the places with no control of the disease, ie, the
places where the number of patients is not decreasing,
are not available for research unless a long-term change
in security conditions takes place.
T h e s eb a r r i e r st h o u g hd i f f i c u l tm a yb eo v e r c o m ew i t h
careful setup of trials, including thorough assessment of
local prevalence, reinforced active search activities, multi-
ple trial sites, longer recruitment periods, and active fol-
low-up to avoid patient loss. These activities however
add to the burden of implementing clinical trials in
poorly resourced settings and undoubtedly increase costs.
The Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi)i s
monitoring the epidemiological evolution and political
environment of HAT-endemic countries to proceed
with field trials of new drug candidates in clinical devel-
opment. Fexinidazole, one of these drug candidates, is
now in the final stages of a Phase I clinical trial and will
soon be studied in DRC [22,23]. Other oral compounds
are being developed and are part of the DNDi pipeline
for HAT [24].
Insufficient International Support and Funding
Given the successes to date of the fight against HAT,
the danger exists of health authorities in affected regions
downgrading HAT from “neglected” to simply ignored
[25]. This attitude could extend to donors and policy-
makers at the international level. The decline in num-
bers could potentially give a reason for further
disinvestment in HAT treatment programming. Mini-
mally, where funding support is sustained, the trend
may continue of integration of HAT activities in areas
where it is neither feasible nor appropriate.
Solutions for providing HAT care in conflict settings
thus require sustained international support from field-
programme implementers and donors [11]. In this
respect, a current looming obstacle is the planned reor-
ientation and disinvestment in HAT-specific projects by
a major donor for HAT programming in DRC, which
carries the bulk of the known case burden. The Belgian
Development Agency (BTC-CTB) has commendably
been one of the major funders for the fight against HAT
in DRC, and moreover, where most governmental
donors have withdrawn completely, they remain one of
the most aware and engaged. However, they now plan
to adjust their approach and work more towards inte-
grating HAT response projects into existing health
structures, which raises concerns [26].
This shift is in line with the current international-
community trend of focusing on integration of neglected
tropical disease (NTD) surveillance and response into
existing health structures. For HAT this poses signifi-
cant difficulties: in most areas where HAT is highly pre-
valent, primary health care facilities are often lacking
and thus nothing exists into which to integrate the com-
plex diagnostic and treatment procedures. Integration
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for HAT in settings where health care infrastructure is
in place and functioning, but for HAT in resource-poor
and conflict areas, specific resources for surveillance and
programming are still needed.
The research funding arena has recently seen an
increase between 2008 and 2009 of 34.7%, up to $46.4
million. Still, more than half of this is directed to basic
research, with only one-third to new drugs and 7% to
new diagnostics. As new drugs come to the door of clin-
ical trials, further funds will be needed to bring them to
the patients [27].
Summary
History has taught us the consequences of allowing
declines in disease surveillance and treatment capacity
for HAT. Unchecked and untreated HAT in conflict
areas, acutely exemplified byt h eO r i e n t a l eP r o v i n c eo f
DRC, poses a significant public health threat that can
extend to other regions. Results from recent research
have shown that the peak incidence of HAT shows a lag
time of 10 years from the start of conflict events. If this
observation holds true in the case of the conflict in the
DRC, we can expect more troubling prevalence rates
before we see a decline [28].
The key components of HAT care and control–active
screening, diagnosis, treatment, and follow-up–are a
challenge to implement in endemic regions, more so in
areas of violent conflict. But providing such HAT care is
not impossible, as evidenced by our intervention experi-
ence in DRC. With committed resources and will, HAT
patients can be accessed and treated in conflict areas,
while taking into consideration security conditions and
medical and logistical capabilities.
In conflict settings of high HAT prevalence, strategies
of integrated care programs may not be feasible due to
lack of infrastructure and security, and thus targeted
(vertical or similar) medical interventions are needed.
Maintaining community networks and coordinating
international and national responses across regions and
borders are important for reaching patients cut off from
care and dealing with displacement. Further R&D is
urgently required for developing new diagnostic tools
and treatments for simpler, field-adapted therapy.
Finally, international support for funding and program
implementation must be ramped up to increase and
improve HAT control in high-prevalence foci. Policy-
makers and donors, as well as researchers and health
care workers, must be informed about the nature and
specificity of this killer disease and the need for targeted
interventions. In particular for people in DRC, HAT
remains a serious health issue requiring ongoing colla-
borative work for any chance at elimination. Given the
scope of the problem, without such efforts HAT could
resurge with devastating public health and socioeco-
nomic consequences.
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